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LAW AND THE LAWYERS- Edward S. Robinson. The Mac-
millan Company, New York City. 1935
In this book Edward S. Robinson, professor of psychology at Yale
University, undertakes the Herculean task of reducing law to a psy-
chological and sociological science. It is time, he urges, for the law men
to realize that every legal problem involves human beings and is essen-
tially a conflict of human interests. It is impossible to separate law from
psychology by the setting up of arbitrary rules. The law has met some
of its greatest theoretical problems by assumptions regarding human
nature which obviously are false. "Instead of showing law students
how natural it is that juries have tended to be lenient towards sick men
and pretty women, such matters have been treated as unfortunate acci-
dents which have no real relationship to the legal process." 1 There is,
too, much fiction in law and not enough fact.
Lawyers do not look with favor upon one who brings forth such pro-
gressive ideas. They rush to the defense of their technique with char-
acteristic conservatism. For centuries the lawyers have applied their own
methods and have shrouded them with theories and fictions which the
laymen cannot and must not understand. Old-fashioned ideas of prece-
dent, the "reasonable man," and similar concepts must now give way to
a new philosophy-a philosophy based on fact, experience and under-
standing. "What will be required of the new juristic philosophy is a
kind of intellectual leadership that will teach people how to discard old
ideas when experience plainly proves those ideas to be wrong or futile." 2
In examining opinions a fact-minded jurisprudence will take into account
the psychological, sociological, and economic details of the particular
case as well as the background of the court in relationship to the case at
bar. Looked upon in this light it will become unnecessary for judges to
base their decisions upon precedents or legal theories chosen to justify
the result which they want to reach.
Professor Robinson acknowledges the efforts made by the realists
who have recognized the psychological basis of a great deal of our law.
Their chief problem in his opinion has been to discover a school of
psychological thought broad enough to follow and this is just about im-
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possible. It will be necessary for the lawyer to become sufficiently
schooled in psychology to pick for himself an adequate theory. The
jurist will have to be his own psychologist.
A general picture of the process of individual deliberation is made
an important and most interesting part of the book. The author pre-
sents a naturalistic3 picture of the judicial process. The opinions of
judges offer an excellent field for psychological study even though the
words and reasons used are chosen subsequent to the conclusion reached.
Frequently the attitude, and sometimes the motives which prompted a
decision, can be read into such opinions. There follows a discussion of
the motives of deliberation and the search for the rule of a case. Pro-
fessor Robinson makes clear that he is merely attempting to point out the
psychological problems that present themselves as soon as one assumes
an empirical attitude toward juridical study. I-e does not pretend to
solve these problems summarily.
There is a great deal to be said for a book promulgating a viewpoint
as progressive as this. The thinking man cannot but agree that legal
conflicts are human conflicts; that judges are human; and that psy-
chology enters into every phase of law. Frequently the long juristic
opinion, though technically complicated, is a personal expression of an
attitude toward a particular issue. No doubt psychology can be over-
emphasized; but where the fields of psychology and jurisprudence come
together, the law should not ignore the union.
An immediate reform of the legal system on the basis of psychology
is of course impossible. Lawyers will protect their vested interests in
"hocus-pocus" to the very limit-all the more strongly because they will
realize the importance and merit of the naturalistic movement. The
obstacles will be numerous and the progress slow; but there vil be
progress.
It is doubtful whether this book will be popular with any except those
persons who have a deep interest in legal philosophy. Never light read-
ing, legal philosophy impregnated with psychological principles is not
rendered less ponderous; nor is any attempt made to make it less diffi-
cult to read. However, the latter portion of the book, made up of con-
crete examples of the judicial process, is not only easy reading but genu-
inely interesting. Perhaps this enhances the general theme promulgating
the naturalistic approach.
The book is particularly recommended to law students and young
lawyers not only because they must be the driving force behind new
ideas, but because so many of them are not acquainted with this element
3 True to fact.
BOOK REVIEWS 199
of the law. Such subjects are carefully avoided in our most progressive
law schools. Students in whom a responsive chord is struck will find a
wealth of footnote references bearing on the subject.
DONALD J. HOLLINGSWORTH
PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAw-A. L. Good-
hart. Stevens & Sons, Ltd., London, Eng., 1934
In this book Professor Goodhart sets out to compare the merits of
the common law doctrine of binding precedent with the continental
theory of precedent established by practice.
Becoming particularly interested in the question of just what are the
arguments in support of the English system Professor Goodhart discovers
that for the most part he can agree with none of them. He does give
one justifiable reason for the common law doctrine and that was the
early need for certainty in the law of England. This need was not so
crying in continental countries for there, even before the Codes, there
was the background of Roman law which furnished a legal system of
developed doctrines.
In building up a body of law there is a great need for certainty;
there must be firm principles upon which the framework rests. This
need for certainty in the development of the English law gave rise to
the theory of binding precedents, for the entire job of construction was
thrown upon the English judges. Precedents were the nails with which
the English legal edifice was held together.
It would seem then that if any other binding force is present prece-
dent does not become important unless it would be to bolster up the
weak places in the structure. On the Continent the Codes were devel-
oped and thus formed a framework for law. The theory of precedent
was not necessary but where a general practice developed under the
Codes precedent eventually fixed that practice.
Professor Goodhart then takes issue with Mr. W. M. Best who
assumes that if the English law were codified, the common law doctrine
of precedent would be the better method of interpretation. This is
hardly true he maintains, for to impose upon the statutes a doctrine of
strict interpretation would soon make them inflexible.
Professor Goodhart then indicates that English law is codified to a
far greater degree than most people realize; and claims that the binding
precedent theory of interpretation is no longer a good one. His respect
for the important part which precedent played in the development of
English law is perhaps the only thing which prevents Professor Good-
